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Remarks on thie opoinion of Black, C. t., in thie case of
SHARPLESS, ET AL., VS. THE MAYOR, &C., OF PHILADELPHIA.*

It seldom happens that an opinion of a Court of law excites an
interest so strong and general as that produced in this community
by the decision in the above case. This interest, hoi ever, is
hardly commensurate with the importance of the case; for the
question involved is nothing less than whether the Legislature can
confer on municipal authorities unlimited power over the property
of every citizen.
The extensive consequences of this decision justify, and are
required, to justify, the expression of an opinion differing from that
of the learned and respected Chief Justice. The declaration of
clear and honest convictions, however, is rendered more urgent by
* The Editors ;f this Journal desire it to be understood, that in admitting this

able article to their pages, they do not intend thereby to assent to all its propositions.-Eds. Am. Law Beg.
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the eminence of the- Judge as a jurist, and the merited confidence
he enjoys; for these qualities, while they add -to the influence of
sound doctrine, give also their sanction to error, if error be committed.
The case arose under recent Acts of Assembly, authorizing cer-.
tain municipal corporations to subscribe for the stock of two railroads situated out of the limits of the respective corporations, and
to raise money for the purpose by a loan.
It is conceded by the Judge, and implied by the enaQtment of
these laws, that no such power was possessed before they were
passed, and that they were necessary to give the power. Municipal corporations already had all the powers required for the purposes of their existence, for their duties and responsibilities.- They
possessed ,them-independent of their charters, and by common law,
as incidents of municipal corporations. The proper functions of
such corporations are confined to the government of the place, to
preserve order and to promote the-health, comfort, convenience and
welfare of its people by police regulations, by" opening roads and
streets, and by the erection of buildings, and such other accommodations as may be required. For these purposes they may imipose
taxes and make ordinances, but beyond these local purposes their
power does not extend. - They cannot enter into schemes for the
general welfare of the place requiring action beyond its limnits.
They cannot atteniipt to promote the wealth or commerce of a city
or district, or its interests of nyhkind, by other means thahi'local
government for local objects.
These principles are developed and expounded, and the authori,
ties supporting tliem collected by Mr. Binney, with the clearness
and force by which he-is always distinguished, in his "Opinion upqn
the right of the City Councils to subscribe for stock of the innsylvania Railroad Company," published in July, 1846. Speaking
of the City, he says: "When we come to the consideration of matters which are not part of her local duties, and are not within her
local superintendence, but operate indirectly upon her welfare as
everything done by the State anywhere in the State does, more or
less-roads, bridges, canals, public works of any; kind-these, as
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they are matters of public concern, and operate upon others as well
as upon the City, and no part of them is within her limits, are altogether within the duty of other persons, and no power can be
implied in the Corporation to effect them or any part of them.
The State may tai our property to make such works; the City
cannot. * * * The power to carry on such public works by the
resources of her inhabitants, or the power to make them because
they might afterwards, by a local work, be made available within
the City, cannot be maintained without throwing the State out of
her orbit and putting the City in her place."
This opinion of Mr. Binney is confirmed by Judge Black, who
says: "No lawyer doubts that a borough can only subscribe to a
railroad when expressly authorized by law to do so."
Such being the law, certain parties, under the plea of the public
good, a plea always used when private interest seeks its gratification at the public expense, have obtained from the Legislature the
enactment of various laws, giving to this City and other municipal
corporations authority to subscribe to the stock of many different
railroads, and to borrow the money to pay for it.
These laws confer power not possessed before, and for objects
not necessary to the government of the City or districts. They
authorize 'the expenditure of money for works beyond their limits,
intended to promote their interest indirectly, and in common with
large portions of the State. Above all, for these purposes, distant
in their sphere, extensive in their influence, foreign to the purposes
of municipal government, and heretofore unknown to the law, they
grant to petty local authorities the power of taxation to an almost
unlimited extent.
Now, the question is-can the Legislati'e constitutionally grant
such powers? If it can we are indeed launched upon a sea of danger and trouble, and hold our property by an insecure tenure; for,
as Judge Black says, "If the power exists it will continue to be
exerted, and generally it will be used under the influence P? those
who are personally intel ested, and who do not see or care for 7he
ultimate injurq it may bring upon the people at large."
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Government is created for the protection of life, liberty and property. These are dear to man, and through ages of contest he has
struggled to surround himself with safeguards to shield them, aid
the best he has yet discovered is a representative gqvernent of
restricted powers. Such is. the government of Pennsylvaw.
But
though its powers are limited, -they are very great. It has the
power to take life, to restrain liberty, to appropriate property, if
done in accordande with ,that written plan of goveronmeut conferring
these powers, called the. Constitution,

.

-

We have reached a point in -our political. progress at which life
and liberty are well ,protected from violence and crueoly, on the
part of government. But from. -attacks on property.we have not
the same security, because, of the universal rapacity which it-stimulates, -and because the various, shapes these attacks assumer.qake it
very difficult -to guard. against them. &.violent'taklng-of. tjieproperty of an individual by the government, qan arbitrary appropria,
ation of it without compensation, would be.a clear violation of, the.
Constitution, wuld excite general. alarm, and the Courts,,would
render it ineffectual. . Measures .sQ coarse and open to .noice"are
not likely to be attempted. I The great danger lies iA.tl power of
taxation. Its approach is. stealthy, -covert, ofter unobserved, It
makes no violent assault. It is always masked by, Qged -good
intentions-by the ever .ready piretext.,of the public.god.. . It is
capable of being prompted and guided and perverted in a lhousandways by fraud, corruption and piivate ends. . It mayb-t.lmado to
serve the interests of a. class, a clique or a party, and. it can assume
so many disgui.es, that the unsuspecting people* may fincd -the -very
citadel of their safety destroyed before they knqw.ther- donger.
For this reason the-power of taxation is the most formidable
engine of tyranny, and sliould.always.be watched with jealous care.
The history of the resistance of the people tp its unjust:exercise
would be a history of the progress of, liberty. Our own -national
history commenced with such resistance,- which resulted in the
establishment of the free institutions under which-we live and prosper. But we should beware of a false and fatal confidence in our
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forms of government. This insidious power is dangerous under all
forms, and quite as likely to do mischief in a democracy as in a
monarchy.
The power to appropriate private property for public uses, without compensation except from such uses, in other words, the power
to tax is an attribute of sovereignty-a high prerogative of government. This power, by the common' law and by grant, municipal
corporations possess and have always possessed as a necessary
incident, to be exercised for local purposes and limited to local
purposes. Such local powers formed an essential part of our system
before the constitution, and are recognized in it. The Legislature
has granted to these corporations an enlarged power of taxation
for general purposes, not necessary or conducive to the exercise of
their functions of local government.
In other words, the government of the State has delegated to
these inferior local governments its power of taxation.
This is very clear. Municipal corporations previous to these acts
of Assembly possessed all the powers necessary for their corporate
purposes, for the regulation of their internal affairs, for the government of their respective places of jurisdiction. They possessed
them of necessity as an attribute of corporate existence-without
which they could not fulfill the purpose of their creation, for this
purpose is local government, it being impossible for the Legislature
to manage the affairs of every town and county in the State. They
possessed them by common law growing out of and supplying that
necessity, and they possessed them by charters and laws giving
them corporate existence, which are declaratory of the common
law. Without such powers they would not be municipal corporations.
But these were all the powers they did possess. They had no
authority to promote their own welfare by means unconnected with
government, beyond their limits and indirectly beneficial. To come
to the case in point, they had no power to impose taxes for the
construction 6f works distant from their places of jurisdiction, and
calculated to increase the trade and wealth of these, in common
with other parts of the State.
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This was no part of.their duty 4nd therefore no part of their
power, bilt it is both the, duty and power of the Legislature. It
belongs to the Legislature because it was confided to it by the people.
The Legislature has d.legated this power to another government to
which it was not confided by the people. Whether the Legislature
has the right thus to divest itself of power, duty and r~sponsibility
imposed on it by the constitution and to substitute others in such a
trust, appears to be a question in this case worthy donsidet1tion.
The first -section of the. first article of the constitution declares
that "the. legislative powerof this commonwealth shall bevested
in a General. Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate-and House
of Representatives."
There can be no such thing as a delegation of trust power. This
is an universal maxim oft law and-morals.- The reason is that confidence in the capacity and fidelity of the party to whom -the power
is given is the foundation and consideration of the trust. The constituent is entitled to the exercise of the ability and judgment of the
trustee whom he selected, not of some one whom he did not select.
To use the language of Judge Bell in Parkervs.- The- (omm,wealth, 6 Barr. 515-" among the primal axioms of jurisprudence,
political and municipal, is to be found -the principle that an ageut,
unless expressly empowered, canhot tratsfer his delegated authority
to another, more .epecially when it rests in. confidence -pa#aking of
the nature of a trust, and requiring for its due discharge understanding, knowledge and rectitude.- The maxim is ' delegata potestos,
not potest delegari.' And -what shall be said to be a higher trust,
based upon a broader confidence than the possession of the legislative function. What task. can be imposed on * man as a member.
of society requiring av deeper knowledge and a purer honesty ? , It
is a duty therefore which- cannot be transferred by the representat.
tive, no, not even to the people themselves, for they have forbidden
it by the solemn expression of their will, that the legislative power
81all be vested in the General Assembly."
But there is a stronger reason. . If the constituent be entitled to
the fair exercise of the ability and judgment of the representative,
he is also entitled to all the guards and checks by which, for his
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protection, the constitution has surrounded the power of that representative. These are-the numbers and qualifications required
in the members of the General Assembly, for a body so large and
so constituted and coming from all parts of the State, is less liable
to improper influenues than the Councils of a City or the Commissioners of a District; the assent of -the Senate, because should
the House of Representatives be guilty of rash and injurious legislation, the wisdom and stability of that body may prevent it; the
approbation of the Executive, which, should both House and Senate
be moved by mistaken or corrupt counsels, may chance to be withheld, and so mischief be prevented. In short he is entitled to the
protection of the whole legislative body, the governor included, upon
which the power and duty of making laws is imposed *bythe constitution, and which jhas no authority to create a subordinate government, an imperium in imperio, by transferring this power and duty
to others.
But it may be said that the Legislature in this case did actthat it really did impose the taxes as it passed in due form the laws
autborizing them. But to this argument the answer is obvious.
These laws are not mandatory-they authorize the municipal officers
to make the subscriptions. The important questions whether the
public interest requires the subscriptions at all, whether the burden
of taxation is not already sufficiently great, and what shall be the
amount of the subscriptions, are left to the judgment of those officers.
They are not made the agents of the Legislature, but discretionary
power is given to them, power to lay taxes for purposes external to
their sphere of action, and affecting it not primarily, but indirectly
as a portion of the State. Such power the constitution has confided only to the Legislature, to be exercised by it alone. If the
Legislature can delegate this, it can delegate any other of its powers,
for it could still be said that the law bestowing the power was a law
exercising it,
The delegation of the power of taxation to municipal corporations, has been likened to the power frequently granted to railroad
companies, to take the *property of individuals for the purposes of
their roads, with compensation to the owner. This is done by the
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right of eminent domainj inherent in every government, and-from
which also is derived the-power of taxaion. -The power thus delegated is purely minist rial, not disvefionary. "The legislature
itself decides on- the propriety of, .making the- road, -- hilst the
course it is to* -take, .ith many .other details, are specified in the
charter. It decides. a dores all that it is .postible for it t'o do,
and then by. its-agnt 'the tailroad conipany, 'does -that'hidi
legislature cannot do -in the-nature ofthingsi-lay out thqtrbal an•
deteriiine .rhose" laa shll be taku; -These duties -tn f'trlbe
performed by
iegeos -ind .surveyors,:they cannot be' pfrt'orme4
by the members
1he
tof legislature. "There isI no delegation 'of
legislative power whatever, 'This -is exercised and eihausted imthe
grant of the chater.' The taking- of the land; is bfy he government acting by its -ageht; the railrodd compaiy, ahnd t6hgorrnidt coild. do no moie and go less, if-it con
t$'"the- *ork
itself, -instead of giving the company the priVilege of constructing it.
Neither 'are the towers of hical government pt~ssesed by municipal corpbratiobs, delegatbd powers, but mor e:lprprly sh nbsdlute
grant of Pdwer which the Legislature cannot itself cbnveniently
exercise. They'aje incidents, inherent 4ualities in all such corporations, a d arise of necessitywheneverthey are created, because essential to the purpbsesof their existence.' To take them away is to' destroy the corpbratio, to form the corporation is to give them. -They
may be eilargedwithbi certain limits, as int the case of th6prvilege
granted io a city or county or township, to pay for the portion of aroad ruri ing through it, but the momnent they*are extended beyond
the sphere of local regulation; and made to embrade external objects
and the interests of other places, theui they become legislative •
power, which-belongs' only to the' legislature, and belongs, to it to
exercise, and not to transfer.
Judge Black, in the able opinion referred to, says very.justly,
"Local taxes for local purposes, and general taxes only for general
purposes, 'which concern the whole State, are a vital principle of
our political system;" ' The question is, what are local purposes?
It is a work which is to benefit 'Philadelphia in common with the
whole State local as to Phila4eiphia. Is the Pennsylvania Rail-
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road, to which the city has also subscribed, which'runs from one
end of the State to the other, which is a benefit to Pittsburg, to
every town and county through which it passes, local as to Philadelphia, which it is expected also to benefit ? Does it not sufficiently "concern the whole State," to become the subject of
"general taxes ?" Are the public improvements, the railroads and
canals made by the State, which are 3f great importance to Philadelphia, local because of that importance, and could the city have
been exclusively taxed to pay for them ? Is it, can it be sufficient,
in the language of this opinion, that "a palpable and clear absence
of all _ossible interest perceptible to every mind at the first blush,"
should be necessary to render such taxation as unconstitutional as
it is manifestly unjust. Ifso, if this scintilla of interest be enough,
there is no work of whatever magnitude, that can directly or indirectly, increase the trade of the city, which may not also be considered local, and for the construction of which, the people of
Philadelphia may not be taxed. A railroad to the Pacific would
materially advance the interests of this city in common with all
other cities in the country. Would that' be local ? Lines of
steamers to the different ports of Europe, would increase our commerce, nay, railroads to facilitate the transport of merchandise to
those ports, would have the same effects, and would be embraced
by this reasoning.j If. every thing is to be considered local, by
which the wealth and prosperity of the city may be indirectly,ancd
in any degree promoted, municipal authorities in Pennsylvania have
indeed a wide scope and a most dangerous power over the property
of citizens.
Judge Black, after stating that the Commonwealth has itself
subscribed to railroad companies, asks: "If the Legislature may
create a debt and lay taxes on the whole community to pay such
subscriptions, may they not with more justice and more propriety,
and with as clear a constitutional right, allow a particular portion
of the people to tax themselves to promote in a similar manner,
a public work in which they have a special interest." If the work
be purely local, the Corporation has the power already, or the
Legislature may constitutionally grant it. If it be of general

ON MUNICIPAL SUBSCRIPTIONS.

interest to the whole State as well as of special interest to the
place taxed, it comes within the sphere of the State government,
which cannot delegate 'its powers for the reasons already given.
Neither can a particular portion of the people, nor the whole
people, tax themselves, except in the manner pointed out in the
constitution, that is, by their representatives. For corporate purposes, their representatives are coi'porate, authorities ; for general
purposes, the State government. No meeting of the people can
lay a-tax or authorize any one else to lay it, nor can the Legislature confer on such meeting, the power to do so. This 'would be a
delegation of legislative power, and unconstitutional, as decided in
Parker vs. 'Te Commonwealth. A meeting of the people can
only express an opinion, which may or may not influence the government. Government alone can act, and in its proper sphere; local
government for local objects, State government for general objects,
and it is ofily by keeping each to its place, that the righits of the
people can be secured.
The learned Judge compares the power to subscribe to railroads,
advantageous to a particular place, but also embracing in their
influence, the whole State, to the power possessed by' municipal
corporations to erect public buildings, and to make roads and
bridges. But the difference between the two cases is important,
and well illustrates our argument. Corporate authorities have nO
power to-erect public buildings, to make roads and'bridges; they
have only power to pay for them. The power to decide whether
the public interest requires them, whether the people shall be taxed
for them, is entrusted to the courts, to the judiciary department bf
the government established by the constitution. Thus placed, the,
power is subjected to yarious conditions and restraints, which are
so many guarantees that- it shall be fairly and wisely exercised.
These guarantees are, the character of the tribunal, composed of
judges supposed to be selected because of their fitness to discharge
high and difficult duties, of Grand Juries and juries of view and
review, temporary representatives of the people of the vicinage;
the opportunity afforded to those interested to be heard by counsel;
the publicity of the proceedings ; 'the duty imposed on the Court to
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give an opinion in the face of the public and of the bar, together
with the reasons for that opinion.
The analogy fails also in another point. The Court cannot authorize
the making a road, the erection of a bridge or public building out
of the county, however advantageous such might be to the interests
of the county. Its jurisdiction and power are local, and extend
only to local objects to be attained by local means.
To bestow, therefore, on municipal corporations, power beyond
these limits, power over things which concern directly or indirectly
the whole State, is to bestow on them legislative power which the
constitution declares shall be vested only in the government of the
Commonwealth, and which it has no authority to delegate; it is
"throwing the State out of her orbit, and putting the City in her
place."
But granting the right of the Legislature to delegate its powet
of taxation, canit be contended that it has the right to delegate
power which it does not itself possess.
Now can the Legislature itself, do what it has authorized the
councils of this City and other municipal corporations to do ? Can
it tax one city or county of the State for purposes connected with,
promoting and intended to promote the interests of the whole
State? The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has constructed
lines of public improvements- throughout the State. For this purpose, it has incurred a heavy debt; the burden of that debt is
borne by the whole State. The City of Philadelphia is benefitted
by those improvements. Her business, her commerce, her wealth,
have been vastly increased by them. Would it have been competent to the Legislature, to impose separately upon her the expense,
or any part of it, of constructing them ? Would it not have been
considered unjust, oppressive, monstrous ? Yet this is precisely
what the Legislature has authorized the Councils of this City, the
Commissioners of the District, and other municipalities to do; for
the works to which it has permitted them to subscribe, penetrate
every part of-the State, are calculated and intended to advance
the interests of every part, and are more extensive and costly than
the State works themselves.
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Would it not also be unconstitutional ? The constitution deelareg
that the legislative power of the commonwealth fihall be vested in a
general assembly. This grat -of -the whole power 'of the commonwealth implies co.extensive 6bjedts. It implies that the god of the
whole shall be promotedaby the. power of the whole. It does not
imply that "such good shall be promoted by the exercise of' the
power of the whole, upon a'part. -On this point we will quote the
language of Judgb Black-. ' "The whole of a public burden. cannot
be thrown -upon an individual under pretene6 of taxing 'him, noi
can one county be taxed to pay the debt of another, 3uor one portion of the state to -ay the debts of the wh-ole state. -These 'thinig
are not excepted froia..'he power 'f 'the "Legislature, because they
did not pass to, the Assembly by the general grant-of ldgislativb
plower. A prohibition was not necessary. An Act of A-ssenbly
commanding oi authorizig 'them -to be done, would not be a law,
but an attempt to pronounce a juaieial 'sentence, order or.decree,"
If one portion of the state cannot be -taxed to pay the debts of
the whole, it follows of n'ecessity that it oa1inot be taxed f!r 'the
betiefit of the whole.
The question again.: aries, what are general initerests And putposes.? The varied concerns of mankind .are, by the wisdom of
nature, so united that it is not easy to benefit a part iithout bendfitting the thol6. A road or-a bridge in one county, increases the
trade bf adjoining counties and through them of the state. An improvement in the wharves of a- sea- port, by promoting its Commerce, adds to the wealth of the interior. A-rail-road in one part,
is a benefit to'all parts. .What-then is the criterion? What con'
stitutes local interest?- It-is obvious that no interest can be strictly
local in its influence any more than any existence, individual or
corporate, can be entirely separate and private, It is connected
with other existences by many ties. The life of a man affects more
or less his fellow men in his various relations, yet le has no difficulty'in distinguishing the obligations of those relations. He can
discriminate between his duties tohimself and family and his duties
as , citizen. The existence of every state in the union has its
influence on every other state, and each owes dutids to itself and to
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all the others, yet the general government cannot lay a tax on
Maine exclusively, for a purpose equally beneficial to Georgia.
Philadelphia and Lancaster County, are reciprocally very advantageous one to the other, yet it would be grossly unjust to tax
Lancaster County alone for the benefit of both. Local purposes
therefore for which local taxes may be imposed, are those whose
effect is direct not indirect, immediate not mediate, exclusive, so
far as in the nature of things they can be'exclusive,.not general.
They are, in short, precisely those purposes for which municipal
corporations were, before these. Acts of Assembly, clothed with
ample power by the common law, by statutes and by the 'constitution, to be exercised by Grand Juries, by Courts, by City Councils
and by Commissioners. To extend them to purposeA embracing
the whole state, with authority to tax their respective districts for
such purposes, is to delegate power to tax a part for the benefit of
the .whole, a power which the Legislature itself does not possess.
The Legislature cannot itself exercise such a power not only for
the reasons already given, not only because as Judge Black says,
such an act would be a "judicial order, sentence or decree," that
is, not legislation but confiscation; but because it would be a violation of Section 10 of the Declaration of Rights, which-says: "nor
shall any -man's property be taken or applied to public use, without
the consent of his representatives and without just compensation
being made." This restriction has been generally referred to what
is called the right of. eminent domain, but the distinction between
this right and that of taxation, relates only to the application of
the power, not to its nature and essence. Both are rights of emi-'
nent domain, that is, both are founded on the supreme power of the
government over private property for public use. When the property of the whole people is taken for general purposes, or of a
portion of the people, for the local purposes of that portion, compensation to these is inferred from the public use to which the property is applied, and it is called taxation. But, when the propertr
of an individual is taken for public use, such compensation is not
implied, and therefore'compensation must be made. Inequality of
the burden makes the difference. To mark the distinctio.a, such
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taking is said to-be by right of eminent domain, probably because
it is a more striking and unusual exercise of. the supreme power
than taxation, and required more special restriction. The~temptation to its abuse is greater, the defences of those subject to it
weaker, for ihat individual; without constitutional, protection, can
withstand the power of government? .Taxation on the other hand
may be resisted. . The wholecommunity is interested to risist, qnd
the ballot box gives it the power.
Now what is the. difference, between taking the property of an
individual for public use, and taking the property of -the people of
a city or district for state use.? Can -thelaw infer 'compnsaion"
more in the one case than in the other; is not the inequality of the
Is the interest, however small. which
burden the same in both
the
work, in common. with the rest-df the
in,
city
.or
district-.has
the
state, a "compensation sufficient to satisfy the'requisitions of the
constitutioi? If so, every. individual whose lr6perty-is taken, -ha
the same degree of interest as- a member of.the o'omminity, for
every one is benefited -more or less by every public improv~wnt,and if such interest be sufficient, then: this provision of- the .consti-*
tution may.be entirely annulled, by-exrcising the right of eminent
. "
domain, under the name and disguise of taxation.
But it is said, an individual may give his property for the public
use, why mday not a city or district, give- its property for state Mse
why may it not be taxed for such use by its ownoonsent?
The answer is, because there is"no.constitutional mode by which
such consent may be -expressed. The. constitution says, that aman's property cannot be taken for public use, .' without the'consent of his representatives," that is his representatives for that pur-.
pose. Meetings of :the people cannot express such consent, for.
they are not his representatives, for any purpose. . Corporate
authorities cannot express it, except for corporate purposes. His
city and county delegates in the legislature, cannot express -it,for
they have no such authority. They represent him only as a
citizen of the State, the moment they are elected they represent
the whole state, their power extends over the whole, they act with
the other representatives of the whole, and hav6":no power to bind
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a.part except in common with the whole. If they had this power,
one of -the chief bulwarks of the constitution would be taken away.
There may be cases in which the distinction between a local and
a general purpose is difficult to define, but in the cases before the
court, in the Water-Gap Rail-road and the Hempfield Rail-road, as
also in -the Pennsylvania Rail-road and a number of others,'the
distinction is broad and marked, it- is to be seen "at the first
blush."
The wise provisions of the constitution for the protection of property, have been disregarded in another most important point, by
this delegation of legislative power.
Article I. Sect. 21st of the Constitution, says: "All bills for
raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives,
but the Senate may propose amendments as in other bills."
The object of this restriction is to secure the people from unjust
and oppressive taxation, by confining the authority to impose it to
their immediate representatives, to the more popular branch of the
Legislature. It was intended to carry out the great principle of
all free governments, the principle on which our own is emphatically founded, that there can be no just taxation without representation.. Only on this condition can it be maintained with truth
that taxation is no tyranny. To wrest this power from kings and
privileged classes, and to place it in the hands of the people, has
been the chief object of those successive contests, out of which has
slowly and painfully arisen, that sheltering, time-honored and
time-cemented fabric of English liberty, whose principles, confirmed by the experience of ages, elaborated by the genius of the
wise and vindicated by the blood of the brave, it has been our happiness to inherit. Among them it would be difficult to mention
one of more importance, than that which is expressed in the language of the constitution just quoted, "all bills for raising revenue,
shall originate in the House of Representatives."
As early as-the reign of Richard I].. the power of originating bills
for revenue was placed'in the House of Commons, by whom a tax
was granted with the assent of the Lords, although the necessity for
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their assent was afterwards disputed.. The maxim that there can be
no just taxation without repTeseiitat'ion was asserted in Magna Charts,
afterwards more fully and comprehensively in the statute called confirmatio c)artarum4 in the tweity-fifth year. of Edward IL, which
abolishes "all aids, taqks and prices, unless by common consent of th
realm and for thecmm onprofit thereof," and'having been at all times
the subject of contention between the crown and the people, it was
finally, in that revolution which cost Charles I. his life and e9tablished. the liberties of England, again declared in the Petition of
Right, -which has ever since been regarded as part of the organic
law, "that no man hereafter be compelled to mate or, yield:any
gift, loan, behevolence, tax, or such like, without common consent
.
by act of Parliament,"
'Noy what is revenue? Isit not money raised from the resources"
of the whole.State, by.the power.of the whole, for the ,good of the'
whole? It cannot be raised- from the'whole for the 'benefit Of a
part. It danpt be raised from a.part foe thie benefit, of'the.whole.
When it is raised, for the benefit of the whole, it must .be by.the
power of the whole:. _The power, thus granted. and thus. limited by
the constitution, reaches the ful exte t .Qf its spherej and.ts it;
cannot be contracted to embrace a,part -soloegl, subordiuate power
.
cannot be enlarged.to.embrace the whole.
The public improvements, the railroads .and canals of- Pennsyl-.
vania, built by thw St4te, were intended to promote aid have pro.
moted the welfare of. the State.-, S.Oine parts have b.qen more
directly benefitted by them-than others,,but all have received bettefit.
direct or indirect. Mathematical equality ,of-benefit- from- such
works is impossible, and what is impqssible.cannot.be required. -It
is sufficient that. they form a great system-of improvement which
has vastly in.rea.se. the .business capacity,,thle fa!cilitiesifor trade,,
and thus the wealth of the whole - State. . These works. Qost about
forty milion.s of dollars. The money was raised by loans on the
credit of the whole State, the interest of whiqh is now paid, and the
principal must hereafter be paid, by taxes laid on the whole State.
These taxes are rightfully. imposed, becaupe they are imposed by
the power of the whole, for the good of the whole. They are
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revenue. They were imposed by bills originating in the House of
Representatives, subject to the amendments and dissent of the
Senate, and to the veto of the Governor, subject to all the checks
and guards provided in the constitution.
The various rail-roads to which the Legislature has authorized
subscriptions by municipal corporations, may be described in the
same language, save as to the means by which they are to-be paid
for. They reach almost every portion of the State, they are more
costly than the State works, and more extensive in their -influence
in increasing the business, the commerce and the wealth of the
whole State. They have been and are to be constructed in great
part by private capital, but to a very considerable extent, to the
extent of upwards of thirteen millions, by taxation.
Now is not the mbney so raised revenue? Is it -not as strictly
and positively revenue as the money raised .by'taxation to build the
State works? If money'raised by taxationto buildthe State works
be revenue; why is' not money raised by taxation to onstruct works
more extensive in their influence on the prosperity of the whole
State also revenue? Judge Black says-:" taxation is. a mode of
raising revenue fpr public purposes,"-and if this money be revenue,
is it not a grave and dangerous violation both .of the letter and
spirit of the constitution, to delegate to City Councils and to Commissioners of Districts, who represent the people for no such purpose,
who have not even the power to, determine on the building of a
bridge or a court house, or the opening of a road, the power to raise
it by taxation. Are not the people, are not especially those who.
are opposed to these taxes, whether a majority or a minority, before
their property is taken, entitled to have the question, whether it
shall be taken, passed upon by their representatives, by the House,.
the Senate and the Governor? Are they not entitled to all the
checks,'balances, defences and guarantees provided in- the constitution ?
As yet, the power thus to raise revenue for the advantage of thewhole State, by taxes laid on a part of it, has been delegated only
to specified corporatiois for specified works. But if the Legislaturecan grant a special, it can also grant a general authority -to all
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municipal corporations, to subscribe to any extent, for any work
which in their judgment may add, directly or indirectly, in any
degree to the prosperity of their respective. localities. The reasoning which sustains the grant of special, will equally sustain the
grant of general power. If these powers exist, they will, as
Judge Black says, be exerted. Many things passing around :us,
assure 'us that they will. When corporations wiolding. great capitals, seek to obtain legislation, they are not -easily denied. They
are armed with "formidable. influences, good and bad. The times
are not.without warnin*g that the power possessed, by government.
to borrow money and to impose taxes, though exercised-.onl..by the
government, guarded as it is by the constitution, is dangerous
enough, that it is not sufficiently guarded. The influences to
which it may be subjected, the purposes to .which -it -may. be perverted, the corruption -of which- it -is the prolific 'source, are
revealing themselves to -all observers.- To delegate this immense
power over the property of every citizen, to the petty authoritiei
of cities and counties. and- districts, to obscure men elected.by small
portions of- the people for small objects; to give to such men,
power-to borrow milliohsa, to imppse-taxes for -millions, for the" construction'of works beginning, and ending hundreds. of miles from
the limits of their minute territories, and embracing intheir scope,
the material interests of the whole State ; to subject-ch men'to
the -seducing infuences .of .capital, of superior intelligence and
social position, seeking their, own inds, of transient, ignorant, local
popular opinion artfully manufactured, inflamed and exaggerated
by demagogues; what is it but to sweep away every restraint
established by the constitution, every defence that stands between,
cupidity and property, and to convert *the government into an
oligarchy, leaving only the mocking forms, the empty shell cf a
republic ?
This power so rashly granted, has already been exerted to such
an extent that important interests. have grown up under it. Valuable improvements have been commenced, millions have been
borrowed, and the bonds which represent them have passed into
the hands of innocent holders. 'A vast amount -of property was
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therefore at stake upon the decision of this case. That is to say,
the practical question involved in the case was, who are the rightful
owners of this property? Ought the money to remain in the
pockets of the people, taxed, or is it to be paid by them to the
holders of the bonds?
Had the decision of the Court been different, much financial
confusion and alarm, much distress and loss to individuals would
have been produced.,. aid this is the natural consequence of unjust
legislation and usurped power. The defrauded holders of the
bonds would have had great reason io complain. They *ould have
had a meritorious claim to indemnity, but upon whom ? Obviously
upon the Legislature, whost error, or something worse, had produced the evil, and through it, upon the people of the State, whose
interests these works iwill so extensively promote. The Legislature
is competent to tax the whole people for them -or any part of them,
because the whole State is benefitted by them.
But such consequences, however disastrous and deplorable, sink
into insignificance, when compared with' the importance of maintaining inviolate, the great principles which are the foundations on
which rest the liberty and -'ecurlty of society. The'destruction of
any amount of property, .is
of small concern," wHen c6mpared with
the destiuction of. those constitutional defences by which all
property is protected. Financial dekangement afad pecuniary loss,
are soon repaired by"enterprise and industry- under free institutions,
but it is. a hard and painful and perilous task to re-construct a
government, to restore the walls of safety which have" been undermined by corruption or shattered by- popular violence and folly.
The lossesi or gains of individuals, however serious, which hang
ul~on the decision of principles of law, above all, of great principles of constitutional law, are interests of the few and of the
passing hour, but the principles themselves command the destinies
of the whole people, and of all the future.
We do not regard this case as"a oau omissue, an exposed and
vulnerable pait of the body politic not protected by the constitution. It is fully covered by the panoply of the organic law, and it
is not necessary to invoke in its defence, "the general principles of

